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authortls <tls@NetBSD.org>2011-11-19 22:51:18 +0000
committertls <tls@NetBSD.org>2011-11-19 22:51:18 +0000
commit8e9334525367ba7642ed9b753a94935c07817c19 (patch)
tree1b53338e20cd060235386b574dbf34d8cf11d50f /sys/dev/mca
parent836ffd606791f7517a3ff458821d8013500d001c (diff)
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/dev/mca')
-rw-r--r--sys/dev/mca/edvar.h4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/sys/dev/mca/edvar.h b/sys/dev/mca/edvar.h
index 8cf6ef1fe0b..b7262dfb13f 100644
--- a/sys/dev/mca/edvar.h
+++ b/sys/dev/mca/edvar.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $NetBSD: edvar.h,v 1.13 2008/05/04 13:11:14 martin Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: edvar.h,v 1.14 2011/11/19 22:51:23 tls Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
@@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ struct ed_softc {
u_int32_t rba; /* # of RBAs */
#if NRND > 0
- rndsource_element_t rnd_source;
+ krndsource_t rnd_source;
#endif
};